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SYNOPSIS 
This report seeks to inform policy makers on the nature and the merit of the arguments for and 
against the concerns associated with a potential technological singularity.  
Part I describes the lessons learned from our investigation of the subject, separating the argu-
ments of merit from the fallacies and misconceptions that confuse the debate and undermine 
its rational resolution. 
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MOTIVATION  
Lately artificial intelligence (AI) has been receiving unusual attention. News outlets scream “Cel-
ebrated Scientists: The End is Nigh!” and tell of prospects of a “robot uprising” catastrophe that 
artificial intelligence may bring about. Others dismiss these concerns as speculative, cultish, 
apocalyptic “Rapture of the Nerds” nonsense. An American think-tank has gone as far as calling 
Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking (and, by implication, some of computer science’s foremost 
geniuses historically!) “fear-mongering luddites”, “innovation killers” and a danger to techno-
logical progress and to America’s safety.  
It is not unusual for scientific controversies to occupy headlines. What’s unusual about the crit-
icism of AI concerns is that it delegitimises the debate. The attacks on expressions of concern 
over AI risks, or over how it should be researched and used, have create the (largely inaccurate) 
impression that experts disagree whether the subject has significance. Such strong and conflict-
ing opinions by authority figures are confusing. 
We ask: Who is right? Should we fear “killer robots”? Stop research in AI? Or perhaps all con-
cerns to public safety are just headline-grabbing, click-bait claptrap? Is the debate at all legiti-
mate? 
The prospects of a major disruptive event —a technological singularity — by around 2045 has 
been examined by scientists for decades and much further back by philosophers. Unfortu-
nately, the recent debate has not always been informed and misunderstandings, misdirection, 
and misinformation have created the illusion of a bitter dispute. 
The general public has also been exposed to personal assistants (eg Siri), satellite navigation, 
picture tagging, game ‘bots’ and other applications of AI. “Singularity” blockbusters and popular 
TV series brought new (and old) ideas to the general public. And a trend in popular media arti-
cles with Arnold Schwarzenegger’s cyborg face in Terminator depicts a dumbed down, misin-
formed, and often mocked perceptions of a “singularity”, which muddy the controversy fur-
ther. 
In reality, like the so called “debates” on climate change and genetic engineering, domain ex-
perts are much more in agreement concerning the timeframe of human-level AI. Where disa-
greements between AI experts exist, they concern scenarios far subtler and more complex than 
the “robot uprising” fairytale. But few can dedicate their time to understand the complex ques-
tions that arise from what may be wrongly considered purely technical questions. Fewer yet 
can keep up with the barrage of publications in the field. 
Yet if there is any truth to these concerns, we cannot afford a “policy vacuum”. 
This is the first report in a series on the singularity controversy, written to inform policy and 
decisions makes on the lessons that Fellows of the Project Sapience have learned from studying 
a potential technological singularity since 2009, including the publication of the first peer-re-
viewed collection on superintelligence: the Singularity Hypotheses volume (Eden et. al 2013). 
The first report focuses on false and unfounded arguments which have repeatedly been used 
to dismiss AI concerns and delegitimise the debate. We believe that the pernicious misconcep-
tions which have haunted the debate undermine its rational resolution. Refuting these fallacies 
is therefore our first step. 
Sapience Project 
— 5 — 
STUDYING THE SINGULARITY 
Although thoughts about the singularity may appear to be very new, in fact such ideas have a 
long philosophical history. To help increase awareness of the deep roots of singularitarian 
thought within traditional philosophy, it may be useful to look at some of its historical ante-
cedents. 
Many philosophers portrayed cosmic process as an ascending curve of positivity. Over time, 
the quantities of intelligence, power or value are always increasing. Technological versions 
have sometimes invoked broad technical progress and have sometimes focused on more spe-
cific outcomes such as the possible recursive self-improvement of artificial intelligence. His-
torical analysis of a broad range of paradigm shifts in science, biology, history, and technology 
— in particular in computing technology — suggest an accelerating rate of progress.  
The predictive power of biological evolution, cultural evolution, and technological evolution 
have been attempted to be unified the under the titles “Big History” (Christian 2010; Christian 
2012) and the “Law of Accelerating Returns” (Kurzweil 2004). Consequently, John von Neu-
mann forecasted the arrival of an “essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which 
human affairs as we know them could not continue”: a statement taken to coin the term tech-
nological singularity in it’s current use. 
This notion of singularity coincides in time and nature with Alan Turing’s (1950) expectation of 
machines to exhibit intelligence on a par with the average human by 2050. John Irving Good 
(Good 1965) and Vernor Vinge (1993) expect it to take the form of an 'intelligence explosion': 
the process by which ultra-intelligent machines design ever more intelligent machines. 
Critics of the technological singularity dismiss these claims as speculative and empirically un-
sound, if not pseudo-scientific. Many valid arguments have been put forth, but by 2009 our 
enquiry has not produced satisfying results because it has remained unclear what the arguments 
under attack actually are. We have learned that accounts of a technological singularity appear 
to disagree on its causes and possible consequences, on timescale and even on the nature of 
superintelligence to emerge, namely machine or (post-) human? An event or a period? Is the 
technological singularity unique, or have there been others? The absence of a consensus on 
basic questions casts doubt whether the notion of singularity is at all coherent. 
To clarify the issues we organised the conference track “Technological Singularity and Accel-
eration Studies” at the European Conference for Computing and Philosophy (ECAP), inviting 
researchers to present contributions from a philosophical, computational, mathematical, and 
scientific points of view (Eden 2009). In July 2009, researchers from the Singularity Institute 
(later renamed the Machine Learning Research Institute), Dartmouth College and elsewhere 
presented their work at the venue of the 7th ECAP at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, 
and again in October 2010 (Eden 2010) for the 8th ECAP at the Technical University in Munich. 
Discussions sought to promote the debate in singularity arguments, for example using methods 
for probabilistic risk assessment, and examining the plausibility of AI arms race scenarios by 
comparing it with the Cold War’s scenarios. None of the track’s participants argued that AI risks 
should be ignored. The main conclusion has been that the issues deserve further clarification, 
and that an appropriate debate on merit of singularity hypotheses had not taken place yet. 
Therefore, in 2010 we called prominent experts with opposing views in the debate to address 
each other in a collection of essays (Eden et al. 2010) entitled “The Singularity Hypothesis: A 
Scientific and Philosophical Assessment”. Virtually all scientists and philosopher who’s studied 
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the subject were invited to make a contribution to the book. By the beginning of 2012 the essays 
were developed and collected into a volume.  
To promote the debate further we’ve invited a short rebuttal to each essay from known critics. 
The essays appeared in the volume published in 2013 (Eden, Moor, et al. 2013), each followed 
by a short rebuttal. The rebuttals, unique among volumes in similar topics, has proven to be a 
crucial contribution to the debate. Below we list some of our conclusions. 
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN 
Almost a decade of research in these issues has led us to the following conclusions: 
Conclusion (A) : 
Singularity = Acceleration + Discontinuity + Superintelligence 
The term technological singularity in its contemporary sense traces back to John von Neumann 
(in Ulam, 1958), popularized by Vernor Vinge (Vinge 1993) and Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil 2006), 
and further elaborated by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Yudkowsky 2007), Robin Henson (Hanson 
2008), and David Chalmers (Chalmers 2010).  
The differences in the accounts have raised doubt whether the term is coherent. Our investiga-
tion has led us to believe that despite their differences, all careful expositions of a technological 
singularity occurring by the mid-21st century can be uniquely described using three common 
characteristics: superintelligence1, acceleration, and discontinuity. 
Superintelligence underlies all singularity scenarios, which see the quantitative measure of in-
telligence, at least as it is measured by traditional IQ tests (such as Wechsler and Stanford-Binet), 
becoming meaningless for capturing the intellectual capabilities of minds that are orders of 
magnitude more intelligent than us. Alternatively, we may say a graph measuring average in-
telligence beyond the singularity in terms of IQ score may display some form of radical dis-
continuity if superintelligence emerges. This remains true whether a particular account de-
scribes the AI or the IA scenario (see Conclusion (A)). For example, it is commonly argued that 
the arrival of human-level AI may soon be followed by artificial superintelligence. And ac-
counts of a singularity from human amplification describe superhuman cognitive capabilities, 
including unbounded memory and accelerating recall times, and the eradication of common 
obstructions to intelligent behaviour such as limited resources, disease and age.  
The discontinuity in accounts of the singularity take the term to stand for a turning-point in 
human history, as in Von Neumann’s canonical definition (“some essential singularity in the 
history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue.”) 
Whether it is taken to last a few hours (e.g. a ‘hard takeoff’ or ‘FOOM’ scenarios) or a period 
spread over decades (e.g., ‘wave’ (Toffler 1980)), the singularity term appears to originate not 
from mathematical singularities (Hirshfeld 2011) but from the discontinuities of gravitational 
singularities — better known as black holes. Seen as a central metaphor, a gravitational singular-
ity is a (theoretical) point at the centre of black holes at which quantities that are otherwise 
                                                   
1 The definition we gave in (Eden, Steinhart, et al. 2013) omits superintelligence, taking it to be implied from the ex-
position of singularity as the immergence of superintelligence, artificial or posthuman.  
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meaningful (e.g., density and space-time curvature) become infinite, or rather meaningless. This 
metaphor is useful to express the idea that superintelligence stands for that level of intelligence 
in which traditional measures become ineffective of meaningless.  
The discontinuity is best explained using the event horizon surrounding gravitational singulari-
ties: we cannot understand or foresee the events that may follow a singularity in the way we 
cannot peek into black holes before crossing the event horizon: a boundary in space-time 
(marked by the Schwarzschild radius around the gravitational singularity) beyond which events 
inside this area cannot be observed from outside, and a horizon beyond which gravitational 
pull becomes so strong that nothing can escape, even light (hence “black”)—a point of no return. 
The emergence of superintelligence marks a similar point, an event horizon, because even “a tiny 
increment in problem-solving ability and group coordination is why we left the other apes in 
the dust” (Sandberg 2014): a discontinuity in our ontological and epistemological account of our 
existence. 
Acceleration refers to a rate of growth in some quantity such as intelligence (Good 1965), com-
putations per second per fixed dollar (Kurzweil, 2005), economic measures of growth rate (Han-
son 1994; Bostrom 2014; Miller 2013) or total output of goods and services (Toffler, 1970), and 
energy rate density (Chaisson 2013). Other accounts of acceleration describe quantitative 
measures of physical, biological, social, cultural, and technological processes of evolution: mile-
stones or paradigm shifts whose timing demonstrates an accelerating pace of change. For ex-
ample, Carl Sagan’s Cosmic Calendar (1977: ch. 1) names milestones in biological evolution 
such as the emergence of eukaryotes, vertebrates, amphibians, mammals, primates, hominidae, 
and Homo sapiens, which show an accelerating trend. Some authors attempt to unify the accel-
eration in these quantities under one law of nature (Adams 1904; Kurzweil 2004; Christian 2010; 
Chaisson 2013): quantitatively or qualitatively measured, acceleration is commonly visualized 
as an upwards-curved mathematical graph which, if projected into the future, is said to be lead-
ing to a discontinuity (see above). 
Conclusion (B) :  
Which singularity do you mean? AI or IA? 
We conclude above that all singularity accounts have three common (and seemingly unique) 
denominators. Nonetheless, it has also become abundantly clear that singularity hypotheses 
refer to either one of two distinct and very different scenarios:  
One scenario, the singularity of artificial (super-)intelligence (AI), refers to (often dystopian) 
the emergence of ‘human-level AI’ and smarter, superintelligent agents or software-based syn-
thetic minds within about four decades. Absent precautions, this scenario sees AI becoming one 
of the greatest potential threats to human existence (Sandberg 2014) or “the worst thing to hap-
pen to humanity in history” (Hawking et al. 2014). On the other hand, the singularity of posthu-
man superintelligence, however, refers to radically different (usually utopian) scenario which 
sees the emergence of superintelligent posthumans within a similar timeframe, resulting from 
the merger of our biology with technology (Kurzweil 2005), specifically intelligence amplifica-
tion (IA). This singularity would see our descendants overcoming disease, aging, hunger, and 
most of the present sources of misery to humans. 
In conclusion, the singularity is an ambiguous term, which either stands for one of the greatest 
threats to human existence (the AI scenario) or the diamaterically opposed humanity’s most 
magnificent transcendence (the IA scenario). This ambiguity caused endless confusion which 
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obscured the debate and helped undermining its legitimacy. The popular media gets the two 
singularities mixed up (Guardian and Cadwalladr 2014). Even respected magazine who under-
taken to “debunk AI myths” (Ars Technica and Goodwins 2015) confuse the two scenarios. 
The Singularity Hypotheses volume has been structured accordingly. In Part I computer scien-
tists describe the uniquely ‘intelligent’ behaviour of programs that possess an ability to learn, 
the plausibility of an intelligence explosion, and the likelihood of a singularity of artificial su-
perintelligence within four decades. In part II, computer scientists discussed the risks of artifi-
cial superintelligence and described the research in ‘friendly AI’. Essays in Part III of the volume 
discussed human enhancement and the plausibility of a singularity of human superintelligence 
within similar timeframe. 
Conclusion (C) : 
Some ‘singularities’ are implausible, incoherent, or no singular 
Part IV of the Singularity Hypotheses volume was dedicated to critics of the technological sin-
gularity. Many view it as a religious idea (Proudfoot 2013; Bringsjord, Bringsjord, and Bello 
2013). The idea of artificial superintelligence emerging by about 2045 has been mockingly de-
scribed as the ‘rapture of the nerds’ (Doctorow and Stross 2013): an (yet another) apocalyptic 
fantasy, a technology-infused variation of doom-and-gloom scenarios originating from mysti-
cism, fiction, cults, and commercial interests.  
A powerful counterargument to singularity hypotheses is offered in the energy density rate the-
ory offered by the physicist Eric Chaisson (Chaisson 2013). Chaisson accepts acceleration and 
superintelligence — two of the three premises underlying singularity accounts (see Conclusion 
(A): Singularity = Acceleration + Discontinuity + Superintelligence), but rejects discontinuity. The 
most potent part of Chaisson’s argument shows that one physical quantity (energy density rate) 
can define and demonstrate the evolution of physical (eg, galaxies), biological (eg, life), cultural 
and technological (eg, aeroplanes) systems, thereby unifying all forms of evolution. As such, 
Chaisson’s work explains and coincides with that of Carl Sagan (Sagan 1977), the historians be-
hind Big History (Christian 2010; Christian 2012; Nazaretyan 2013), the Law of Accelerating 
Returns (Kurzweil 2004) and others. Chaisson’s theory also embraces the emergence of super-
intelligence as “the next evolutionary leap forward beyond sentient beings”. But Chaisson’s am-
bitious acceleration theory also underplays the premise of discontinuity: in cosmic scale, he ar-
gues, there is no reason to claim that this step be “any more important than the past emergence 
of increasingly intricate complex systems.” 
Conclusion (D) :  
Pulp “singularities” are not scientific hypotheses 
The term singularity in general use has been vastly influenced by the recent spate of Hollywood 
blockbusters and popular TV series. To illustrate their use of the term, philosophers (Schneider 
2009) and scientists (Hawking et al. 2014) used movies to illustrate how they convey their un-
derstanding of singularity.  
Indeed, some science fiction stories has greatly contributed to our understanding of AI behav-
iour and its risks. But blockbusters and TV series have also taken artistic freedom, drawing in-
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creasingly irrational scenarios. For example, the ‘robot uprising’ scenario in the film Termina-
tor2 depicts a malevolent artificial superintelligence (“Skynet”) who sets killer robots to chase 
crowds and mercilessly gun them down. Similarly, AIs in The Matrix have enslaved the human 
race, farming our bodies3 for the highly unlikely purpose of generating electricity4.  
The unprecedented popularity of cinematic works that used the term have associated the (tech-
nological) singularity with that variation of the Golem fairytale in which the human race strug-
gles to survive against an army of hostile shapeshifting robots. Thus the cultural construct — 
the singularity meme (Dawkins 2000; Blackmore 2001) — has become synonymous with the 
pulp fiction’s malevolent AIs in the robot uprising narrative, largely ignoring subtler and more 
rational AIs such as depicted in 2001: Space Odyssey and Ex Machina. 
Many expositions of singularity hypotheses discuss the risks of artificial superintelligence. Most 
essayists explicitly reject the robot uprising scenario. Nonetheless, critics often attack the plot 
of films, conflating the singularity meme with scientific hypotheses. Confusion has remained 
despite numerous headlines in the mass media ‘debunking’ common misconceptions. Some 
singularity critics have even gone as far as to misattribute the plot of films to authors who have 
taken to distance themselves from the singularity meme5. This confusion has often derailed the 
debate. Below we have undertaken to debunk several fallacies arising from this confusion. 
In discussing the risks of AI, authors of scientifically or philosophically sound singularity hy-
potheses distance themselves further from the singularity meme by emphasising the dangers 
of indifferent rather than aggressively hostile AI. The distinction between malevolent and indif-
ferent separates the meme from the scientific hypotheses. It is explained further in our next 
Conclusion. 
Conclusion (E) : 
The risks of AI arise from indifference, not malevolence 
Nearly all singularity hypotheses — that is, the scientifically and philosophically informed expo-
sitions of the singularity — have taken pains to reject the robot uprising scenario. Aggressive 
malevolence is uniformly dismissed as apocalyptic fantasy, one which may have been (mistak-
enly?) called “science fiction”. The idea of a spontaneous emergence of a class of hostile AIs is 
considered anthropomorphic, irrational, and hence highly implausible. 
Some AI theorists argued that self-preservation may be a basic drive (Omohundro 2008)6, or a 
emergent property of artificial superintelligence rather than being explicitly programmed fea-
ture (Bostrom 2014). But rational singularity accounts reject the idea of AIs that have somehow 
spontaneously had human traits ‘popping into existence’. Rather, singularity hypotheses argue 
that the risks associated with artificial superintelligence concern indifference, not malevolence. 
Indeed, the anthropomorphic bias a recurring theme in the literature on AI safety. Human bias, 
they explain, leads us to expect just AI agent to undergo a sudden and unexplained emergence 
                                                   
2 and Chronicles of Sarah Connor TV series 
3 And in the process creating a very detailed simulation of reality to keep us under 
4 The human body generates only as much electricity as a potato — but people cost a lot more to ‘farm’ than potatoes. 
5  Eg (Guardian and Cadwalladr 2014) and (Ars Technica and Goodwins 2015) 
6 Omohundro’s argument however makes several assumptions. The premises include a restricted class of artificial 
superintelligence (self-improving, utility-driven etc.) under specific circumstances (eg under free market forces etc.) 
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of emotions, such as malevolence; capabilities, such as empathy; and needs, such as autonomy 
and self-expression. In fact, an existential risk far more serious comes from an advanced race 
of artificially superintelligent agents that lack anthropomorphic emotions and needs. There-
fore, by Occam’s razor if not strictly in terms of probability theory, we can safely ignore the 
assumption that they will develop human traits spontaneously. 
In fact, there is an even greater risk that the emerging race of superintelligence may be lethally 
indifferent to the human race, regardless whether the superintelligence is artificial, posthuman, 
alien, or whatnot. To see why one need only witness how we, Homo Sapiens, have been indiffer-
ent to the welfare of less intelligent species. We farm pigs in cramped cages because we like 
bacon and not because we “seek to enslave” the species. And Sea Minks have gone extinct not 
because anyone “sought to exterminate” them but because they were hunted down. The wider 
is the intelligence gap, the more indifferent superintelligent beings may be towards humans. 
They may not hesitate to wipe out a city of ordinary humans more than we hesitate to destroy 
an anthill while building a new motorway. 
Concerns for AI safety are not limited to the emergence of a race of artificially superintelligent 
agents for AIs. The canonical example of the Paperclip Factory illustrates how dangerous can 
superintelligence be, even if it is built by well-meaning programmers, unless well-meaning, 
‘friendly’ or ‘philanthropic’ supergoals are built into it: 
The risks in developing superintelligence include the risk of failure to give it the supergoal of 
philanthropy. One way in which this could happen is … that a well-meaning team of program-
mers make a big mistake in designing its goal system. This could result, to return to the earlier 
example, in a superintelligence whose top goal is the manufacturing of paperclips, with the con-
sequence that it starts transforming first all of earth and then increasing portions of space into 
paperclip manufacturing facilities. (Bostrom 2003) 
More subtly, indifference may also refer to the risk which exists even from well-meaning artifi-
cially developed superintelligence: that indifference which arises from ignorance of humanity’s 
core values. A well-meaning artificial superintelligence may be dangerous, unless it is ‘friendly’ 
to humans (Yudkowsky 2013; Bostrom 2014), in particular towards core values such as freedom, 
autonomy, and self-expression. Otherwise, the risk is that an AI may conclude that the best 
thing for the human race would be to put us all under hallucinogenic drugs, or bring about 
some ‘false utopia’, namely “a state of affairs that we might [temporarily] judge as desirable but 
which in fact …things essential to human flourishing have been irreversibly lost.” (Bostrom 
2003) 
Conclusion (F) : 
The risk of AI is essentially like the risk of any powerful technology 
Which advice are offered by authors discussing risks from AI? The Future of Life Institute has 
recently published an open letter “from AI & Robotics Researchers” urging AI research to be 
subject to the same risk considerations as research in the physical sciences: 
Just as most chemists and biologists have no interest in building chemical or biological weapons, 
most AI researchers have no interest in building AI weapons (Future of Life Institute 2015) 
This argument for AI safety is neither novel nor unusual. For example, atomic energy can be 
very dangerous. To prevent its misuse, international treaties limit the production of military-
grade nuclear energy and the sale of machinery and radioactive material capable of producing 
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atomic weapons. Warning against an AI arms race (Future of Life Institute 2015), the Future of 
Life Institute’s open letter takes the comparison to nuclear energy to its limits: 
Unlike nuclear weapons, [autonomous killer robots] require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw 
materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-
produced. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands 
of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate 
ethnic cleansing, etc.  
Another analogy is offered to the risks of certain experiments in genetic engineering, in partic-
ular involving recombinant DNA which may create deadly pathogens in a process that is much 
less costly to than producing atomic energy, as well as far more available and easier to misused, 
but with results no-less catastrophic. To stem the misuse of such technology, the Asilomar con-
ference called for a voluntary moratorium on certain experiments, but it also offered safety 
guidelines and recommended that the research continues. The measures proved effective and 
the moratorium has been universally observed. A recent study found several analogies between 
the concerns expressed in the Asilomar conference to the concerns from AI (Grace 2015), such 
as the focus on relatively novel risks from a new technology and the complexity of reasoning 
about the risks7. 
The science fiction of Isaac Asimov — who was a scientist as much as he was an author — took 
for granted the requirement for safeguards on machine intelligence. Asimov explained that 
safeguards which “apply, as a matter of course, to every tool that human beings use" (Asimov 
1983). Elsewhere Asimov compares his Laws to circuit interrupters: 
A tool must not be unsafe to use. Hammers have handles and screwdrivers have hilts to help 
increase grip. … [To] perform its function efficiently [a tool mustn’t] harm the user. This is the 
entire reason ground-fault circuit interrupters exist. Any running tool will have its power cut 
if a circuit senses that some current is not returning to the neutral wire, and hence might be 
flowing through the user. (Asimov 1993, in Wikipedia: "Robot Visions") 
In conclusion, technology has always been a double-edged sword, and even AI becomes an ex-
istential threat, it won’t be the first one. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice — if fantasy is to help us get the 
point — offers a more compelling scenario than that of the raging terminators. The tale of the 
dangerous outcome of the apprentice’s careless experiments demonstrates the simple fact that 
when potent forces fall into his inadequately trained and irresponsible hands, control over 
forces may easily be lost, to deadly effects. Or as Nick Bostrom has put it:  
We need to be careful about what we wish for from a superintelligence, because we might get it. (Bostrom 
2003) 
Conclusion (G) :  
We’re not clear what “artificial intelligence” means 
Textbooks typically present artificial intelligence as subdiscipline of computing sciences and a 
body of knowledge for solving “difficult” challenges. This practice defines AI (indirectly) by 
those challenges that were considered “difficult but solvable” at the time of writing the textbook. 
The set of these challenges however has consistently grown since AI’s infancy. For example, 
                                                   
7 The study also found one main difference, in that the risks addressed in the 1975 Asilomar conference appeared to 
be “overwhelmingly immediate”, unlike human-level AI, which is not expected less than fifteen years in the future. 
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during the 1970s challenges such playing chess or the Jeopardy! game competently were consid-
ered too difficult. Most experts did not expect these challenges to be met anytime soon — with 
some arguing that AI could never win in these games or reason effectively in ambiguous do-
mains such as natural language and image recognition. Within decades, Deep Blue beat the 
world’s chess champion and IBM Watson won against two world champions in a televised Jeop-
ardy! game. By the time of writing this, clever app developers can turn mobile devices to 
grandmaster-level chess players, and Watson, which can acquire knowledge from “reading” 
standard text such as encyclopaedias and articles, has learned to diagnose many medical con-
ditions as well as most doctors. Image recognition programs have so improved over the years 
that the CAPTCHA task8 have become increasingly difficult for humans to read, and simulta-
neously easy for computers to read, until CAPTCHAs have largely lost their claim to be able to 
“tell Computers and Humans Apart”. Bots disguising themselves as available, lovelorn women, 
game characters, and friends in trouble are increasingly indistinguishable from humans. Thus 
within seven decades quite a few challenges that seemed possibly insurmountable have been 
downgraded to child’s play in a similar manner. What artificial intelligence means in practice has 
changed accordingly from a limited set of capabilities into one that seeks to approximate hu-
mans’. 
Since the meaning of ‘artificial intelligence’ has so much evolved, experts use the terms Hu-
man-Level Artificial Intelligence (HLAI) and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) with reference 
to that point in the discipline’s progress in which humans are challenged across a sufficiently 
wide range of capabilities. AI experts therefore commonly take artificial intelligence to be de-
fined in comparison with human intelligence. This leads to several problems: The first problem 
is that psychologists predominantly reduce human intelligence to one quotient measured using 
psychometric (IQ) tests. But the hypothesis of a single, generic capability (called the g factor) 
does not explain for other forms of human intelligence such as creative genius, strategic talent, 
and social competence. It also does not explain non-human intelligence, although the abilities 
to use tools and plan ahead were demonstrated by many animal species. Obviously the g factor 
theory does not help us understand alien intelligence9. In conclusion, canonical accounts of 
human intelligence have not helped us measure artificial and nonhuman intelligence. 
Legg and Hutter (Legg and Hutter 2007) define Universal Intelligence, a metric10 for measuring 
the level of intelligence of any agent in a given environment — human, animal, or artificial. 
The metric uses Kolmogorov complexity to measures the difficulty of problems an agent solves 
well, a measure which has proven hard if not impossible to establish. And the metric’s applica-
bility is yet to be tested empirically. Importantly, however, the theory of Universal Intelligence 
defines the intelligence of a given agent as a function of the environment in which it operates. More 
precisely, the intelligence of an agent in a given environment is proportional to the agent’s 
ability to maximize the utility of solving those problems which the environment is more likely 
to pose. Thus, an agent exhibits high intelligence in environments that happen to maximize the 
utility of those problems which the agent competently solves, and at once also exhibit low in-
telligence in other environments. This feature of Universal Intelligence sits well with our un-
derstanding of intelligence; an encouraging result. But Legg and Hutter’s theory has so far not 
helped clarify what ‘artificial intelligence’ mean in more practical terms. 
                                                   
8 CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart, a test to de-
termine whether an attempt for remote access is made by a human or by a bot. 
9 That is, whatever it the Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence is searching for a sign of. 
10 or rather a family of metrics 
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The difficulties to ‘pin down’ what AI means undermine our ability to assess its risks: we don’t 
know which capabilities could (and could not) be developed in the near future, how long it will 
take to make available applications of each new capability, what is the likelihood of losing con-
trol over technology that will emerge from these applications, or under which circumstances if 
any the unintended consequences of future AI technology could pose an existential risk.  
We explained the sense in which AI technologies can safely be said to have become more pow-
erful, and that the trend may continue. But how far? Research in superintelligence (Bostrom 
2014) have given us reasons to believe that the difference between apes and humans is dwarfed 
by gap between humans intelligence and superintelligence. Yet it is entirely unclear how much 
more intelligent will artificial agents become in the near future. Without further research we 
are left to guess whether no significant advances are likely or whether we should prepare our-
selves to AI capabilities that are so advanced that it could ‘turn the lights off’ before we could 
blink. Such uncertainty is clearly undesirable. 
Conclusion (H) :  
The debate hasn’t ended; it has barely begun 
In 2012, after compiling the essays and rebuttals for the Singularity Hypotheses volume, we 
concluded that “the rapid growth in singularity research seems set to continue and perhaps 
accelerate” (Eden, Steinhart, et al. 2013). Since then prominent scientists have pushed to invest 
in this direction (Hawking et al. 2014; Future of Life Institute 2015), followed by sensational 
headlines and the controversy described above, which did not promote the debate but merely 
caricaturised and muddled it further. As the following questions remain open it is clear that the 
debate has barely began. 
OPEN QUESTIONS 
Our investigation has also led us to conclude that the issues centre around a number of open 
questions, such as the following? 
Question 1:  
Can AI be controlled? 
If loss of control over AI may indeed pose such a dangerous outcome then scientists feel com-
pelled to ask how the risk can be eliminated or reduced. Research in this question has largely 
led to the conclusion that controlling the behaviour of agents that are more intelligent than 
their makers is difficult if not impossible (Bostrom 2014) — in particular if the agent learns to 
modify itself (Yampolskiy 2012). 
One strategy of maintaining some control is commonly referred to as Friendly AI: research 
arising largely from the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (Yudkowsky 2001; Yudkowsky 
2013) which focuses on methods of designing AIs whose behaviour would be considered 
‘friendly’ or morally justified — for example by hardwiring artificial agents with our core val-
ues. A major difficulty with the approach is that it raises the notoriously tricky question of what 
exactly constitutes moral behaviour. For some people, morality implies equal distribution of 
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wealth; to others, establishing an oppressive global caliphate. In other words, the notion of 
‘friendly’ AI seems to require an objective theory of morality or a universal notion of ‘good’, a 
notoriously difficult goal if not a computationally intractable one (Brundage 2014). Further-
more, formal methods (Wing 1990; Hinchey et al. 2008) in software engineering have taught 
us that it is largely impossible to guarantee that a particular program implements a desired 
behaviour — assuming that behaviour (objective friendliness) can be established and formally 
defined. 
Another strategy for controlling AIs seeks to confine artificial agents ("AI boxing") to a ‘leak-
proof’ environment in a manner that could prevent undesired outcomes from materializing, 
for example, by sealing AIs in special hardware or by confining it to simulated environments. 
Vernor Vinge (Vinge 1993) has famously described the difficulty with the boxing approach us-
ing the example of superintelligent agent who can ‘think’ millions of times faster than its cap-
tives, and therefore could easily “come up with ‘helpful advice’ that would incidentally set [it] 
free”.  
A promising strategy for controlling AI suggests to restrict the use of artificial agents to answer-
ing Yes and No questions. The Oracle AI strategy (Bostrom 2014) minimizes the potential im-
pact of AIs by limiting them to one capability, which is to answer questions either with Ttrue 
or False.  
The question of controlling AI fits within the more general question of mechanism design, a body 
of work which in 2007 was awarded a Nobel Prize in economics for studying the optimal mech-
anisms to reach a certain goal. So far, this research indicates that such questions are difficult 
because information about individual preferences and available production technologies is dis-
tributed among many actors who may use their privately held information to further their own 
interests11. 
Finally, some suggested to outlaw research that may lead to artificial superintelligence (Joy 
2000). However, even if regulators conclude that AI is so risky that its enormous benefits must 
be abandoned, banning it is unlikely to stop it. Rather, a ban is likely to push AI research un-
derground, resulting in independent programmers and private labs conducting unmonitored 
experiments, which would be even less desirable. 
A major difficulty with control strategies is that even if a foolproof method for controlling AIs 
is discovered it would have to be globally enforced, which is difficult because of the military 
incentives of nations and the monetary incentives of commercially motivated organization. In 
particular, totalitarian regimes and corporations may be tempted to loosen or remove AI con-
trols for the purpose of gaining an advantage over their rivals, as demonstrated for example in 
the scenario of a global AI Arms Race (Istvan 2015; Future of Life Institute 2015). 
Question 2:  
AI or IA?  
Analysing singularity hypotheses (Conclusion (B)) yielded the distinction between dystopian 
and utopian singularity scenarios, suggesting not a mutually exclusive circumstances but rather 
a race between artificial and posthuman superintelligence. The outcome of this race is therefore 
                                                   
11 Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Press Release: “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007”. 
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an open question whose answer may mark the difference between the best and the worst de-
velopments in human history. The question of who will ‘win the race’ has neatly been summa-
rized as: "Will our successors be our descendants?" (Pearce 2013), or more pithily12, “AI or IA?” 
Question 3:  
Can we prove AIs are becoming more intelligent? 
Critics of artificial superintelligence ideas often reject the common perception that AI has ever 
made genuine breakthroughs. It is argued that each new capability is merely an insignificant 
application of a pre-existing technology, and the systems which demonstrate them have re-
mained narrow, rigid, and brittle (Allen 2011). One of the questions central to this debate is 
therefore whether one could quantify the intellectual advantage of newer AIs over systems built 
by older principles. A metric that can measure the intelligence of different AIs effectively might 
provide the means to find out how much more intelligent AI has become, and possibly improve 
our understanding of the way it is going. 
SUMMARY 
Our central conclusion is that the controversy over the future of AI should be replaced by a 
reasoned and well-informed debate in the questions this technology raises, as the issues are 
much too important to — 
 remain confused & misinformed  
 be derailed by fantasy the likes of Hollywood's Skynet 
 be left to academics & experts 
 or be merely speculated about by pundits, amateurs, and opinionated philistines. 
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